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Striking NYNEX 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] The four-month strike by 60,000 telephone workers at NYNEX in 1989 was one of the largest and 
most significant anti-concession struggles of the decade. 
In an era when many unions have lost highly publicized contract fights and been forced to make give-
backs, the NYNEX strikers successfully resisted management demands that they pay hundreds and 
eventually thousands of dollars a year for their medical coverage. They also defeated the company's drive 
for new forms of "flexible compensation" designed to replace base wage increases and COLAs with lump-
sum payments and profit-sharing. 
Successful union resistance to these concessions would not have been possible without an 
unprecedented pre-strike program of membership education and internal organizing. The contract 
campaign conducted by the 30 NYNEX local unions within the Communications Workers of America 
(CWA) and their allies in NYNEX units represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
(IBEW) reflects CWA's nationwide commitment to rankand- file mobilization through the "one-on-one" 
approach. 
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Striking 
NYNEX 
* Steve Early 
The four-month strike by 60,000 telephone workers at NYNEX 
in 1989 was one of the largest and most significant anti-concession 
struggles of the decade. 
In an era when many unions have lost highly publicized con-
tract fights and been forced to make give-backs, the NYNEX 
strikers successfully resisted management demands that they pay 
hundreds and eventually thousands of dollars a year for their 
medical coverage. They also defeated the company's drive for new 
forms of "flexible compensation" designed to replace base wage 
increases and COLAs with lump-sum payments and profit-sharing. 
Successful union resistance to these concessions would not have 
been possible without an unprecedented pre-strike program of 
membership education and internal organizing. The contract cam-
paign conducted by the 30 NYNEX local unions within the Com-
munications Workers of America (CWA) and their allies in NYNEX 
units represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers (IBEW) reflects CWA's nationwide commitment to rank-
and-file mobilization through the "one-on-one" approach. 
The tactics and strategies used during the strike—and the 18 
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months of preparation that preceded it—illustrate how union staff, 
local leaders, and rank-and-file activists can work together in a 
large regional bargaining unit to overcome the organizational 
weaknesses that have proved fatal in many other fights against 
give-backs during the 1980s. While the strike itself exacted a great 
financial and human toll, the mobilization process that enabled 
NYNEX workers to maintain solidarity and win a new contract 
has changed and strengthened the way many local unions operate 
on an ongoing basis 
Large numbers of stewards, chief stewards, and local officers 
who served as "mobilization coordinators" in 1988-89 now under-
stand the importance of systematic internal organization, educa-
tion, and membership participation—not only for future contract 
campaigns but also in local union efforts to organize the unorga-
nized, achieve labor's political goals, and deal with contract issues 
outside the narrow framework of grievance and arbitration 
procedures. 
Many activists within CWA's NYNEX unit clearly remain more 
comfortable with the traditional roles of stewards, local officers 
and staff representatives in the "servicing model" of unionism. 
But there is far greater acceptance of the need for "organizing 
model" initiatives like one-on-one workplace canvassing and 
recruitment of volunteers, systematic distribution of steward 
newsletters and other union literature, issue-oriented shopfloor 
activity from button-wearing to informational picketing, alliances 
with other unions and community organizations, and a more 
adversarial stance toward management during the life of the 
contract. 
This article describes how CWA District 1 prepared for 1989 
bargaining in a manner quite different than in the past. Coordi-
nated bargaining and strike unity of CWA and IBEW were major 
factors in the final outcome of the strike. But without the internal 
restructuring and intensive pre-expiration program of membership 
activity initiated by CWA, neither union would have been able 
to withstand management pressure for an unfavorable settlement. 
Why Mobilization Was Needed At NYNEX 
Our 1989 conflict with NYNEX had its roots in the failure of 
union solidarity three years earlier. 
CWA represents only two-thirds of the 60,000 unionized employ-
ees at NYNEX, primarily at its New York Tel subsidiary; the IBEW 
represents the rest, mainly in New England. In 1986, local leaders 
of the two unions agreed to jointly resist any health care cost shift-
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ing demands, but at the last moment of 1986 bargaining, IBEW's 
NYNEX bargaining council capitulated on the issue and then sat 
out a 9-day CWA strike over it. The IBEW negotiated a controver-
sial "me-too" agreement, protecting its members from premium 
contributions only if CWA successfully resisted them. 
The settlement CWA reached with NYNEX under these circum-
stances was a source of future trouble. During the life of the 
unions' 1986-89 contract, no CWA or IBEW members would make 
premium contributions or pay higher deductibles. But if the com-
pany's actual medical plan costs exceeded a certain amount in 
1988, the contract stipulated that NYNEX employees would start 
to pay the difference on August 6, 1989—the first day of the next 
three-year contract. 
The choice of this date clearly reflected CWA's position that the 
whole issue was up for renegotiation in 1989 bargaining. NYNEX, 
on the other hand, mistakenly assumed that cost shifting was a 
"done deal" for 1989-92. Therefore, it refused to participate in 
any meaningful health care cost containment discussions during 
the life of the contract. And it tried to sugarcoat cost shifting for 
thousands of its managers—who began paying for their benefits 
in 1986—by telling them that bargaining unit employees would 
soon be contributing to their coverage as well. 
For the company, the only unresolved question in 1989 was how 
much CWA and IBEW members would pay under their new con-
tract. CWA's defense of the 100% company-paid coverage its 
members had enjoyed since 1970 required the dismantling of cost-
shifting mechanisms already being put into place. 
By 1989, of course, the bargaining climate on health care issues 
had only gotten worse. NYNEX could now point to dozens of other 
major companies that required larger co-payments, deductibles 
or premium contributions to shift the burden of medical cost 
inflation to their employees. Firms like NYNEX that provided 
fully-paid coverage were increasingly rare. 
The lost strike and concession bargaining trends of the 1980s 
also cast a shadow over the union's 1989 talks. Both NYNEX and 
CWA were well aware of the weakness of the four-week national 
walkout by 150,000 CWA members at AT&T in 1986. Like the 
briefer strike at NYNEX that year, CWA had been undermined 
by the IBEW's acceptance of a "me-too" deal, keeping their AT&T 
members—a quarter of the unionized workforce—on the job while 
CWA struck. Worse, by the end of the walk-out nearly 25% of the 
workers represented by CWA were scabbing as well. The com-
pany was able to use its high degree of automation and large 
management workforce to maintain long distance telephone ser-
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vice with very little apparent disruption. As a result, AT&T workers 
lost their cost-of-living clause (and have yet to regain it). 
To avoid a repetition of this setback—which was a real possibility 
in 1989, even in the more homogeneous and militant CWA NYNEX 
unit—the union had to have a more effective game plan for fighting 
back. Membership mobilization—through education, agitation and 
stronger internal organization—was the key to that plan. 
Getting the Mobilization Started 
Planning for 1989 began at a December 1987 meeting of officers 
from all CWA NYNEX locals convened by International Vice-
President Jan Pierce, the administrative director of the union's 
District 1. With few exceptions, the participants agreed that CWAs 
1986 mobilization activity at NYNEX had been too little, too late— 
and definitely not sufficient to prepare the membership for any-
thing other than the short work stoppage that ensued. 
In 1986, as the strike deadline approached, there had been some 
informational picketing, distribution of one piece of literature on 
possible strike issues, and some sporadic last-minute experimen-
tation with "working to rule." These efforts had been coordinated 
by a hastily assembled mobilization committee that included 
representatives from only a handful of NYNEX locals. There was 
no formal coordinated bargaining arrangement with the IBEW and 
no joint membership activity or mobilization plan. 
Overall, there had been too much of a traditional and exclusive 
focus on what happened at the bargaining table—as opposed to 
away from it. There was not enough information disseminated 
about the status of negotiations and no grassroots membership 
force to back up the union's negotiators in hundreds of NYNEX 
workplaces. 
To ensure that that did not happen again in 1989, the NYNEX 
local presidents set up a regional committee of mobilization coor-
dinators—one from each local. In smaller locals, the president 
usually played this role; in larger ones, where the president was 
likely to be directly involved in negotiations, another officer or 
executive board member was picked. Meeting on a monthly basis 
starting 18 months before the contract was up, the local coordi-
nators began to identify rank-and-file members, stewards and chief 
stewards willing to act as building and work group coordinators 
in each local. The goal was to recruit one mobilization activist for 
every ten bargaining unit members so that there would be an effec-
tive, face-to-face communications network throughout the contract 
campaign and, eventually, a unit-wide "Committee of 4,000" 
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engaged in mobilization activity. 
Each local was responsible for providing District 1 headquarters 
with the names, home addresses and work locations of all mobili-
zation volunteers. (A total of about 3,000 ended up on the mail-
ing list.) This expansion and strengthening of the union's existing 
steward network took many months but was absolutely essential 
because all later activity—whether one-on-one surveying about 
contract issues, literature distribution, or workplace displays of 
solidarity—could not have been carried out without many more 
activists in place. 
The first task of the coordinators, in the Spring of 1988, was 
to solicit stock proxies from thousands of members so a union 
delegation could attend NYNEX's annual meeting and make a 
strong bargaining-related statement. In this initial and unprece-
dented effort, almost 7,000 workers signed their proxies over to 
the union; a year later, after widespread one-on-one training, better 
list-keeping and more systematic internal organizing work, the 
number of employee/shareholders who participated in CWA's 1989 
proxy solicitation drive almost doubled. 
Beginning in the summer of 1988—a full 12 months before 
negotiations began—District 1 staff held special training sessions 
in each local for mobilization coordinators. The training focused 
on the nuts-and-bolts of internal organizing (how to overcome 
apathy, get people involved, give them things to do, etc.) and con-
tract campaign tactics and strategies employed by other unions 
in industries where labor's traditional economic weapon—the 
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strike—has been undermined by automation, scab-herding, and 
other management counter-measures. The message was clear: 
CWA members had to wage a Wobbly-style "inside campaign" 
that generated sufficient pressure on NYNEX to settle or, in the 
event of a strike, helped make the work stoppage as effective as 
possible. Also discussed in detail was the possibility of departing 
from the union's traditional "no contract, no work" stance and 
working without a contract after expiration—a sometimes contro-
versial option ultimately rejected by CWA's regional bargaining 
committee. 
While this educational process continued in the Fall of 1988, 
diplomatic relations with the IBEW were resumed. After a series 
of meetings involving local and international officials on both 
sides, the two unions agreed to seek joint bargaining with NYNEX 
in 1989. If the company refused (which it did), IBEW and CWA 
agreed to coordinate their separate regional negotiations by pre-
senting identical demands, maintaining close contact, and having 
representatives of the other union at each bargaining table. This 
major breakthrough was announced in January 1989 in the first 
issue of a monthly—and, later, more frequently published— 
Mobilization Report sent to all CWA coordinators and IBEW 
local leaders. 
The Mobilization Report became an important tool for promot-
ing ongoing contract campaign activity and keeping coordinators 
informed about the progress of bargaining. In early 1989, for 
example, it explained CWA's negotiating goals as developed by the 
regional bargaining council. Later bulletins highlighted examples 
of direct action on the job over local issues and rallied support 
for the union's second annual proxy solicitation drive. 
The FACTS Campaign 
In conjunction with 10,000-member CWA Local 1101 in New 
York City, District 1 launched a ' 'campaign-within-the-campaign'' 
called FACTS—the Fight Against Cost Shifting. FACTS was a critical 
preemptive strike against management's attempt to make cost 
shifting an accomplished fact even before negotiations began on 
June 13. The company tried to do this by sending payroll deduc-
tion cards to all union-represented employees and urging them 
to authorize weekly premium payments (amounting to $ 10.27 per 
member), effective August 6th. The company told all IBEW and 
CWA members that if they refused to make the new premium con-
tributions, they would be immediately shifted to a "minimum 
medical plan" requiring large deductibles ($500 individual and 
\ 
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$1,500 family) for hospital care. 
During the late winter and spring of 1989, the union's hundreds 
of mobilization coordinators engaged in systematic leafletting, 
workplace meetings, one-on-one discussions, and widespread 
wearing of FACTS buttons and stickers to win the credibility battle 
with management over the inevitability of cost shifting. On 
February 15, 1989, for example, thousands of CWA and IBEW 
members came to work wearing anti-cost shifting paraphernalia 
as part of a highly visible FACTS Day protest that included infor-
mational picketing at lunchtime. At an employee reception prior 
to the NYNEX annual meeting several months later, New York 
City locals turned out an angry crowd of 700 workers who per-
sonally confronted top officers of the company and forced them 
to retreat from the stage in disarray after a brief question-and-
answer session about cost shifting. 
When NYNEX began distributing the payroll deduction cards 
for premium sharing, mobilization coordinators systematically 
contacted fellow members in their work group and urged them 
to turn the cards in to the union, keeping close track of who did 
and who didn't. The vast majority of cards were then presented 
to management on the first day of bargaining as overwhelming 
evidence of worker opposition to the company's cost shifting 
demands. A potential pre-expiration rout on this key issue was 
thus transformed into a concerted workplace drive that sent 
management a message of solidarity and strength, rather than 
weakness and division. 
After the FACTS phase of the campaign, coordinators promoted 
a variety of other workplace actions. On June 13—the first day 
of bargaining—all members were asked to report for work wear-
ing red to show the company that "it's bargaining with all of us." 
Buttons, ribbons, hats, T-shirts, suspenders, and other color coordi-
nated apparel created what one local officer called "a sea of red" 
in many offices. In some locals, workers continued to wear red 
every Thursday from the beginning of negotiations until the first 
week of August, when the strike began. Others stood in place at 
their work locations at a designated time, engaged in coordinated 
pencil-tapping while sitting at their desks, and participated in other 
small but annoying and increasingly disruptive gestures of soli-
darity. Our Side of The Story, a post-strike report on the NYNEX 
struggle prepared by District 1, describes what happened next: 
' As expiration drew closer, we escalated our tactics. We 
picketed outside work locations before starting the work-
day with signs that said 'Just Practicing,' and then marched 
\ 
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into work in unity. We worked to rule. We forgot our ID 
cards at major locations where cards must be presented 
to gain entrance. 
"About ten days before expiration, we picketed with 
signs that said 'Just Practicing' and then marched in seven 
minutes late. We knew we'd struck a nerve at the com-
pany when, instead of docking employees for a quarter 
hour of lateness, nearly 100 were given one-day suspen-
sions for participating in illegal job actions, and thousands 
more received warnings. In some locations, supervisors 
began to threaten workers with warnings and suspensions 
if they refused to stop tapping at their desks or standing 
in place." 
One week before the contract expired, CWA mobilization coordi-
nators and IBEW stewards staged simultaneous mass rallies in 
New York and Boston that helped focus greater public and media 
attention on the impending showdown with the company. The 
stage was set for the strike of '89 and—fortunately for those 
involved—18 months of mobilization had produced a membership 
more informed, united, and determined than ever before. 
The Strike 
Some observers—inside and outside the union—have expressed 
well-founded doubts about the viability of traditional work stop-
pages in the telephone industry because of the length of time it 
takes to achieve the desired economic impact. According to its 
official post-mortem, CWA District 1 discovered "that it takes at 
least two months to really begin to hurt the company.'' But given 
the decision of the union's bargaining team to plunge ahead with 
an all-out walk-out in August 1989, mobilization enabled CWA's 
NYNEX locals to conduct a much higher impact strike than 
previous struggles. 
One key difference from the past was the enormous amount 
of mobile and mass picketing employed in 1989, which required 
an unprecedented level of membership involvement in "follow-
ing the work" and confronting the company in nontraditional 
ways. Instead of just politely walking on picketlines outside empty 
garages or office buildings where armies of managers, temps, and 
other nonunion employees were doing strikers' jobs, CWA used 
the mobilization structure to organize teams of strikers to aggres-
sively pursue and picket hundreds of company vehicles wherever 
struck work was being performed in the field. In addition, regular 
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rank-and-file rallies, marches and car caravans were held at the 
homes of top NYNEX executives and retired managers called back 
to scab, at the hotels housing contract laborers brought in from 
other states, and at any public event involving the company or 
its officials. 
The strikers' militance and creativity had its downside—hun-
dreds of arrests and more than 250 strike-related suspensions and 
firings that were still being contested more than a year later. But 
their activities also raised the company's strike security costs and 
lowered its scab productivity and morale to unexpected levels. An 
internal NYNEX document complained that CWA and IBEW 
picketing was "the worst we have ever seen. . .the degree and 
intensity of harassment is devastating." 
Ultimately, however, some of the unions' most effective pressure 
points proved to be away from struck workplaces—among con-
sumers, utility regulators and state legislators. Here also, prior 
membership mobilization paid off handsomely. For several years 
before the strike, CWA had been using the one-on-one approach 
to involve more of its New York members in political action. 
NYNEX locals had engaged in several rounds of systematic 
grassroots lobbying on behalf of legislation that would restrict 
secret employer monitoring of employee telephone conversations 
with customers. While the union had not yet succeeded in get-
\ 
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ting its "anti-bugging" bill through the Republican-controlled state 
Senate, CWA members had become well known among state politi-
cians for their well-organized rank-and-file demonstrations, letter-
writing, phone-calling, and "accountability sessions" with indivi-
dual legislators. 
Right in the middle of the strike, N.Y. Tel had the bad timing 
to seek a $360 million rate hike from the state Public Service Com-
mission (PSC). CWA strikers gathered 100,000 signatures on peti-
tions opposing the increase and got 130 state legislators, over 60% 
of the total legislature, to sign full-page anti-rate hike ads in The 
New York Times and Albany Times-Union. CWA formed a coali-
tion with religious, student, senior citizen and community organi-
zations to intervene in the regulatory process. Press conferences 
featuring Jesse Jackson and Ralph Nader were held, and strikers 
distributed tens of thousands of pamphlets urging residential 
customers to "hang up" on NYNEX's attempt to double their 
monthly bills. 
By the fourth month of the strike, the company realized it was 
facing a major defeat at the PSC and risking long-term disruption 
of its carefully cultivated relationships with politicians and regu-
lators. In Massachusetts, meanwhile, a parallel IBEW effort to stall 
legislative action on the introduction of new charges for directory 
assistance was making a similar point about the potentially damag-
ing role that either union could play in the political arena. CWA 
was ultimately so effective in blocking the N.Y. rate request that an 
ongoing program of regulatory activism is now an important part 
of the union's effort to develop new forms of bargaining leverage. 
During the strike, the mobilization coordinators' network was 
also utilized to maintain contact with strikers and their families, 
attending to their individual financial needs through the CWA 
Defense Fund and the filing of claims for unemployment benefits 
and continued medical coverage. Scabbing was thus held to a 
minimum—even though employee medical benefits were cut off 
one month after the strike began and IBEW members had no 
national strike fund to draw on. Among CWA strikers, less than 
1% of the membership crossed the picket line in 17 weeks. Local 
1108 on Long Island, for example, had only one scab out of 1,525 
members. In Albany Local 1118, even 80 of the local's 90 non-
members participated in the entire strike. Without mobilization, 
these statistics would have been quite different. 
Mobilization's Role in the Future 
The defeat of NYNEX's cost shifting demands in 1989 was 
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largely a defensive victory for IBEW and CWA. Their difficult fight 
to maintain the status quo with the company's medical plan did 
not resolve other critical issues involving the introduction of new 
technology contracting out of bargaining unit work, or the main-
tenance of a union-free environment in NYNEX's fast-growing 
unregulated subsidiaries, where thousands of jobs are being 
created rather than eliminated. In addition, management seems 
intent on implementing health care cost shifting for retired 
workers, and even the active workforce may again face medical 
benefit concession demands in the next round of bargaining. 
Few members of either IBEW or CWA will be eager to wage 
another long strike next year. CWA spent almost its entire $16 
million strike fund on the first eight weeks of the '89 strike and 
had to borrow another $15 million from the Japanese telephone 
workers federation to finance the rest of it—a debt that will take 
several years to repay. So, financially, the union won't be in the 
best condition for a rematch in 1992. 
Mobilization, however, continues to provide the union with an 
internal organizational framework for identifying and addressing 
these and other problems its NYNEX members face. In the 18 
months since the 1989 settlement, educational work with the coor-
dinators network and further coordination of NYNEX local union 
activity around contract issues have made it possible for many 
rank-and-filers to assess the lessons of the strike and how they 
might be applied to CWA's ongoing labor-management struggles. 
District 1, for example, is still producing and distributing a 
NYNEX Union Mobilization Report, which now reaches about 
5,000 CWA and IBEW activists. Recent editions have publicized 
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local union initiatives against contract labor, the need for manage-
ment neutrality and card check recognition to aid recruitment of 
nonunion NYNEX workers, and the latest regulatory develop-
ments affecting both NYNEX employees and customers. 
On the first anniversary of the strike, 100 IBEW and CWA 
officers and activists held an unusual day-long conference in 
Boston on union strategies for the future in the telephone industry. 
In workshops and plenary sessions, they evaluated the strengths 
and weaknesses of the strike, debated alternative tactics and 
strategies for 1992, and compared notes on local union problems 
with contract enforcement. 
Prior to the 1989 contract campaign, there was very little sys-
tematic or structured discussion of the union's strategic options, 
either within locals or as part of the periodic exchanges between 
NYNEX local presidents. In perhaps its most important and 
hopefully lasting contribution to the ' 'culture of unionism'' within 
NYNEX, mobilization has legitimized free-wheeling debate and 
constructive self-criticism of the sort that very rarely occurs at 
the local union level in American labor. Rather than just waiting 
forsomeone on high—either in the local or the international—to 
decide the union's approach to dealing with NYNEX, active 
members are being challenged to come up with their own answers 
to difficult policy questions and then share responsibility for 
implementing the new approaches decided upon. 
The ability of CWA and IBEW to meet the challenges of 1992 
very much depends on the further development of this process. 
If, for example, the unions choose to pursue a selective strike 
strategy next time, or a more intensive "in-plant" campaign as 
an alternative to striking, the job actions involved will require care-
ful targetting, planning, and orchestration—a degree of organiza-
tional unity and flexibility far beyond that achieved in 1989. Only 
membership education and mobilization on an even wider scale 
will enable the unions to enter their next negotiations with new— 
and possibly more cost effective—weapons in their arsenal. 
There is no greater testament to the future potential of mobiliza-
tion than the fact that the mere mention of the term brings frowns 
to the faces of the company's labor relations representatives. 
When, they ask, is the union going to stop talking about mobiliza-
tion? The strike is over, they say, and it's time for NYNEX and 
its unions to start building a "more mature relationship." 
An informed, involved and aroused membership is, of course, 
seen as an impediment to such a relationship. But, for the NYNEX 
unions, it's their only hope of going beyond holding the line and 
resuming the forward motion of labor in the telephone industry. • 
